Th e aim of this paper is to study the eff ect of emulation within a basic schema of the monetary theory of production (MTP
Introduction
Th e European Central Bank reports that the rate of variation of negotiated wage rates, with respect to the previous year, declined from 6.65  in 1992 to 2.16  in 2007 and that the infl ation rate grew from 1.8  in 2000 to 3.5  at the beginning of 2008. Th e IMF then reports that, in the case of the USA, there was a fall in real wages of about 10  between the '70s and the '90s, 6  of which corresponds to the fall between the '80s and the '90s. Hein and Truger (2007: 225) fi nd that »moderate wage increases were accompanied by a decline in the labour income share, both in the Euro area and in the USA« and that, in particular, the labour income share in the Euro area passed from about 62  in 1992 to about 57  in 2005, while -in the USA -it started from over 63  to reach 62  in 2005. Th e European Central Bank also reports that entrepreneurial net income raised from 504,134 million € in 1999 to 1,033,931 million € in 2008. 1 Importantly, in the Eurozone, the consumer credit index -provided by the ECB -has grown from 7.6 in 2004 to 8.7 in 2008. Evidence also shows the increase of consumption of ›luxury goods‹ due to the increase of the fi nancial sphere (above all, of banks' profi ts at the beginning of 2000's). Palley (2007) , in particular, shows that the ›rentier share‹ rose dramatically in the period between the 1970s and the 1990s, and that it generated increasing income inequality and a decline in the growth rate. Power et al. (2003) also report that the rentier income share in the USA rose from about 15  in the 1960s to about 35  in the 1990s, and that it continued to rise from 1995 to 2000, reaching about 45 . Th ese fi gures have been at the basis of a widespread debate on the causes of the increasing inequality of income distribution as well as on the role of consumer credit in contemporary capitalist economies, and this paper aims at providing some theoretical hints in order to interpret them from a heterodox point of view.
Conventional wisdom, in fact, supports the idea that increasing worker indebtedness is mainly caused by fi nancial deregulation -which allows cheaper and easier access to consumer credit -and low interest rates. It is also maintained that it tends to produce positive social outcomes, since consumer credit growth is high when households are optimistic about their future income and, thus, consumer credit growth is positively related to future consumption (Maki 2000) . In this view, fi nancial innovations -such as the development of subprime mortgages -allow a relaxation of credit rationing, favouring the poor or those in minority communities, previously considered too risky by traditional lenders (Kiff /Mills 2007) .
2 Moreover, as suggested by Bertola and Koeninger (2007) , among others, the reduction of fi nancial constraints has a positive eff ect on investments in human capital.
By contrast, some heterodox economists -particularly within Marxian-Kaleckian theoretical approaches -have recently pointed out that indebtedness derives from low wages and from restrictive fi scal and monetary policies and that it is grafted onto 1 URL: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu. 2
Th e mainstream view also provides a microeconomic approach to consumer credit, based on the idea that the credit contract is signed in conditions of asymmetric information. See Soman/Cheema (2002) , Sullivan et al. (2000 and 2001) and Lawrence (2008), among others. 3 Th e eff ects of consumer credit on the business cycle has recently been explored by Tagkalakis (2007) , among others, who remarks that private indebtedness contributes to reducing the intensity of the recessive phases and that this eff ect is in operation only in contexts where the banking system is accommodating. Moreover, if this is not the case, he fi nds that expansive fi scal policies are not eff ective (see also Bouveng 1966 and Slocum/Lee Mathews 1970) .
On the empirical ground, Seccareccia (2005) fi nds a positive relation between restrictive fi scal policy and household indebtedness. He argues that household indebtedness, in contexts where taxation increases and/or public expenditure decreases, serves the sole purpose of guaranteeing a constant level of consumption, thus not giving rise to an increase in consumption and therefore to a multiplier eff ect (i.e. what he names a ›bad‹ indebtedness). Following this line of thought, this paper aims to explore the theoretical nexus between indebtedness and money profi ts, supporting the view that indebtedness ultimately depends on emulative eff ects. Using the Monetary Th eory of Production (hereafter MTP) as the theoretical framework, this paper addresses two questions: a) How does income distribution vary when indebtedness-driven emulative behaviours in consumption are in operation? b) Can the consideration of the existence of emulative behaviours in consumption help to solve the ›paradox of profi ts‹ which arises in the MTP, i.e. the impossibility for fi rms to obtain a monetary surplus? It will be shown that indebtedness on the part of workers is an important condition for making money profi ts, both for industrial fi rms and for banks, and that it ultimately produces a less equal income distribution.
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Th e exposition is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general theoretical framework, by superimposing the role of emulative behaviours onto the basic scheme of the MTP; in Section 3 a model is presented, designed to show that income inequality increases along with the level of indebtedness, thus generating a decline in real wages and the realization of a money surplus. Section 4 concludes.
Th e theoretical framework: Th e monetary theory of production and the ›paradox of profi ts‹
Th e Monetary Th eory of Production (or circuit approach) is based on the idea that contemporary economies are credit economies, as stated by Keynes above all in A Treatise on Money of 1930 (see Arena/Salvadori 2004 , Fontana/Realfonzo 2005 . It is ultimately based on the assumption that the process of creation of purchasing power is endogenous and demand-driven, depending on fi rms' demand for credit, i.e. for so-called initial fi nance (see Realfonzo 2003) . In this context, banks are not pure fi nancial intermediaries and -by contrast with the mainstream view -›loans make deposits‹. Th e monetary circuit is supposed 4 In a similar vein Lown (2005) who has recently argued »at the same time that bankruptcy rates are rising, credit card issuers have increased their profi ts by aggressively expanding their marketing and extending credit to marginal borrowers they would not have considered only a decade before. Despite the higher risks of default and bankruptcy, high interest rates, over the limit fees, and late penalties paid by marginal borrowers result in substantial profi ts. Th is expansion of consumer credit to marginal borrowers has been referred to as the democratization of credit whereby everyone, regardless of ability to repay, has the right to borrow money, even if the interest rates are extortionate. While the decade of the 90s is well known for the booming stock market, for most Americans it was the decade of debt« (Lown 2005: 402, italics added). to develop in sequential steps which involve three macro-agents: banks, fi rms and workers. Credit is demanded when fi rms put their production plans into operation, and the amount of initial fi nance equals the money wage bill fi rms have negotiated with workers. At the end of the circuit, fi rms reimburse banks their debts. Th e reimbursement of debt is made possible via money revenues fi rms can collect in the market for goods and/or via money they collect by selling securities in the fi nancial market (Graziani 2003) . Since at best fi rms can only recoup the total amount of the initial fi nance, there is a problem of how they can make suffi cient revenues to not only pay interest, but make a profi t. Th e lack of realization of a monetary surplus can be seen as a theoretical problem if one rejects the convictionsupported, among others, by Graziani (2003) -that a ›normal‹ level of indebtedness on the part of fi rms toward the banking system is a key feature of contemporary capitalist economies. Diff erent solutions have been put forward (see Dupont/Reus 1989 , Parguez 2004 . Some authors maintain that profi ts can be obtained only in real terms (see Bellofi ore/Realfonzo 1997). Others introduce variants of the standard structure using multi-sectorial models (see Parguez 1980 , Seccareccia 2003 , including profi ts in the same wage bill (see Rossi 2002) or additional demands expressed by the State and/or by the external sector or by the banks themselves (see De Vroy 1988 , Renaud 2000 . Following this line of thought, Parguez (2007) remarks that the reproduction of the capitalist system -as represented in the MTP -can be guaranteed above all via expansionary fi scal policies.
5 Nell (2002) points out that a basic if neglected step in monetary theory is to show that a given amount of money will enable all transactions to take place in money, in contexts where the money advanced equals the current costs. He proposes to solve the problem by considering the interdependences existing between diff erent sectors and the diff erent sequences of transaction among sectors, also by considering that fi nancing involves a sequential process, within a Kaleckian theoretical framework (see also Renaud 2000) . Messori and Zazzaro (2005) show that monetary profi ts can be generated by the bankruptcy of the less effi cient fi rms, and Zazzaro (2003: 234) emphasises that this solution leads to abandoning »any concept of subjective and/or objective equilibrium […] in favour of a systemic concept of order«. Zezza (2004) argues that -since in the MTP theoretical framework banks aim at obtaining interest payments in order to pay for their costs of production (namely, their employees' wages) plus profi ts to distribute to bank owners, fi rms' money profi ts ultimately derive from undistributed profi ts obtained by the banking sector as well as from wages of workers in the banking sector. Rochon (2005: 125) fi nds that monetary profi ts may be made in cases where the bank is divided between short term and long term contracts. Chapman and Keen (2006) show 5 Th e author argues that expansionary fi scal policy can be regarded as an ›anchor‹ of profi t expectations. He stresses that expansive fi scal policy allows employment to increase thanks to the additional fl ow of money that the State produces. In short, the higher the defi cit spending the higher the employment in the public sector and, since fi rms' expectations of profi ts rise, the higher the additional employment in the private sector. See also Parguez (2006 and who also focus -within a schema of the MTP -on the role of consumer spending in increasing total demand and money profi ts. that aggregate money profi ts can arise in a dynamic context where a continuous time function is considered in overlapping circuits. Febrero (2008) maintains that fi rms as a whole can obtain money profi ts -within one single circuit -by means of long-term debt with the banking system. By inserting Veblenian elements into the basic schema of the MTP, Forges Davanzati and Realfonzo (2009) provide a theoretical model where the economy is considered as being formed by two sectors: one producing wage goods, the other producing luxury goods. Financial rents have a double nature. Th ey are both a cost for fi rms, in the form of the interest bill, and an item of demand (for luxury goods). Consumption on the part of the ›leisure class‹ increases the demand, and thus profi ts, of fi rms operating in the sector producing luxury goods.
However circuitists have devoted little attention to the role of consumer credit, although evidence shows that it has become a major feature of contemporary capitalist economies.
6 Within this theoretical framework Pacella (2008) has recently shown that positive variations of workers' propensity to indebtness can have a positive eff ect on employment thanks to additional expansion of consumption.
7 Otherwise, as will be shown, on purely theoretical grounds, indebtedness on the part of workers can allow fi rms to obtain aggregate money profi ts, thus providing a further possible solution to the ›paradox of profi ts‹. It is worth noting that the paradox of profi ts is not something which pertains to the logical structure of the MTP and, hence, it should not be conceived as a pure logical puzzle. On the contrary, it focuses on a key problem of the capitalist system, namely the problem of the realization of a monetary surplus (see Bellofi ore et al. 2000) . One can argue thatdepending on historical and social conditions -capitalism solves the problem in diff erent ways (i.e. increasing public expenditure, promoting export), and that indebtedness on the part of workers -not being a mere ›outside factor‹ used here as an ad hoc assumption -is, as a matter of fact, a social device functional to the reproduction of the system. In this sense, the MTP approach provides an ›open‹ model, where the closure of the circuit depends on ›outside factors‹ which are historically, institutionally and socially determined, as well as empirically/factually signifi cant. It should be added that -by its very nature -the problem of the realization of a monetary surplus is a macroeconomic problem. Th e mainstream view is rejected here, i.e. the idea that household indebtedness ultimately depends on low interest rates and on the increasing quality of fi nancial products, while it is maintained that workers tend to get into debt when wages are low. Moreover, it is suggested that wages are perceived as ›low‹ when workers compare their standard of living with that of richer individuals. Ac- 6 Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), among others, provide massive evidence on the role of consumer credit in the expansion of the US economy during the last decade, within a theoretical framework where it is assumed that fi nancial preferences evolve as social norms, interacting with both cultural trends and institutional changes. 7
Within the mainstream view, the links between consumer credit and aggregate demand have been explored, in particular, by Pagano (1989 and 1994) who fi nd a low reactivity of consumption with respect to indebtness (see also Ludvigson 1999) . For a study of the dynamics of consumption composition in relation to variations in private indebtness see in particular Messinis et al. (2002) . cordingly, workers' propensity to become indebted is seen here as the result of emulative behaviours, which ultimately determine their target level of consumption. 8 In this theoretical context, emulation is strictly connected with class affi liation.
9 Individuals do not choose in an institutional vacuum but compare their consumption with that of others, i.e. the consumption of individuals belonging to certain reference groups.
10 Post Keynesian scholars stress the role of wage relativities in industrial relations.
11 In her seminal contribution, Joan Robinson (1962: 70) points out that »the cause of movements in moneywages is bound up with the competition of diff erent groups of workers to maintain or improve their relative position«. Wiles (1973: 379) observes that »the communication revolution […] making everyone instantly aware of everything, has sharply increased the amount of envy and imitation in the world«. Rowthorn (1977) considers that wages are a function of the level of unemployment -due to the ›industrial reserve army‹ eff ect -and of the consumption on the part of high-paid workers, so that if the general wage level is expected to rise, each group of workers will demand wage increases so as to preserve their relative position in the wage hierarchy.
12 Lavoie (1992: 379) remarks that the »core of a Post-Keynesian explanation of price and wage infl ation [is] based on the notion of equity« and that equity, in turn, is strictly linked to the »normative pressures of relative fair wages and the need to preserve one's status within the pecking order of labour hierarchy« 13 . 8
Cf. Pacella (2008) in which worker indebtness is proportionate to the reduction of workers' bargaining power in the labour market. 9
In a similar vein see Hayakawa and Venieris (1977) and Lee Mathews and Slocum (1969) . Th e basic mainstream approach to consumer behaviour, considering that preferences are exogenous, does not take emulative eff ects into consideration. By contrast, insofar as emulation implies endogenous preferences, it does not rely on methodological individualism. Th e conviction that income comparison is a major factor for understanding individual decisions is shared by many ›heterodox‹ scholars, belonging to diff erent strands: post-Keynesians, Institutionalists, economists dealing with Neuroeconomics, Experimental Economics, Behavioural Economics, and Ethical Economics. For a general survey see, among others, Schmid (2004) . On a historical reconstruction of theories of emulation see Hayakawa (1999) . 10 In a similar vein, Bowles and Park (2005) reach the conclusion that working hours go up as the inequality of income distribution increases. Th is may occur because the desire to emulate the standard of consumption of the rich infl uences workers' allocation of time between labour and leisure (see also Corneo/Jeanne 1999) . 11
In the General Th eory, Keynes (1936: 14) emphasises that »any individual or group of individuals, who consent to a reduction of money-wage relatively to others, will suff er a relative reduction in real wages, which is a suffi cient justifi cation for them to resist it«. 12 Wage relativities are sometimes used to explain the determination of the ›fair wage‹, in the conviction that the notions of equity and justice are an important part of non-orthodox economics in comparison with the mainstream view (Lavoie 1992: 379) . 13
He adds that to »follow the opinion of the majority« is one of the basic strategies in order to face uncertainty in a Keynesian world. Moreover, imitative behaviour constitutes a helpful guide in decisions and tends to become a norm: these norms, in turn, represent ›focal points‹ since they are generated by the opinions of the most powerful and respected groups. See also Setterfi eld (2007). Assuming that banks supply purchasing power when someone asks for it, and by considering that possible exchanges within the fi rm sector give rise to a zero-sum game (see Graziani 2003) , the demand for credit equals the money wage bill (so-called ›initial fi nance‹). Th is is the beginning of the circuit (steps 1 and 2). Firms as a whole use credit in order to pay
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Step 3.1: comparison of wages workers (step 3), and workers supply labour services (step 4). If, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the propensity to consume equals 1, no savings are available to the banking system or to the fi nancial markets. Th erefore, as fi nancial markets are not in operation, the entire money wage bill comes back to fi rms once workers acquire consumption goods and services (steps 5 and 6). As stated below, if two groups of workers exist, and low paid workers emulate high paid workers via consumer credit, additional purchasing power fl ows have to be considered. 14 Banks fi nance low-paid workers (steps 3.2 and 3.3), thus giving rise to additional consumption (step 6.1) to the benefi t of fi rms, and indebtedness on the part of workers (step 6.2). Finally, fi rms reimburse banks their debts in step 7.
Emulation raises profi ts: Workers' indebtedness and inequality
Th e role of emulation in aff ecting the path of income distribution within the theoretical framework of the MTP -as described in the previous section -is now captured by a simple macroeconomic model, based on the following assumptions. 1) Th e economy is formed by two sectors, where two consumption goods (1 and 2) are produced. Type-1 fi rms are assumed to provide good jobs, and to pay their workers higher wages than type-2 fi rms. 15 Firms fi x prices under the mark-up rule, and the money interest rate -being a cost of production -enters the price equation (see Docherty 2005), i.e. p = (w / π) (1 + r) (1 + i), where p is the unitary price, w is the unitary money wage, π is labour productivity, r the normal rate of profi ts and i the money rate of interest. 2) At the beginning of the monetary circuit, the following conditions hold: p 1 > p 2 , 17 with w 1 > w 2 and π 1 = π 2 , 18 i 1 = i 2 , r 1 = r 2 . Workers in Sector 2 -being low-paid -emulate 14 Note while type-1 workers have a propensity to consume equal to 1, type-2 workers have a propensity to consume higher than 1. 15 Fairris and Jonasson (2008: 98) point out that while neoclassical economic models of perfectly competitive labour markets explain pay diff erences across workers on the grounds of the diff erences in human capital and of the quality of working conditions (the so-called theory of compensating differentials), heterodox economics -and, particularly, institutional labour economics -emphasises that »pay may be positively related to fi rm size, the cost of labour turnover, the diffi culty of monitoring labour eff ort, or the need to attract a more talented applicant pool«. 16 Th e idea that the interest rate, being a cost of production, enters the price function is also supported -within a Sraffi an theoretical framework -by Pivetti (1991) . It is worth noting that -in this scheme -the interest rate is a ›tax on profi ts‹. Moreover, following the Marxian argument, one can argue that if the interest rate signifi cantly increases, capitalists may fi nd it convenient to allocate resources in the money and/or fi nancial market. 17 Th is condition derives from the fact that wages paid by type-1 fi rms are higher than wages paid by type-2 fi rms. 18 Th e assumption of equal labour productivities can be justifi ed with the argument that while productivity of high-paid workers, usually employed in big fi rms, mainly depends on the stock of (hu-workers in Sector 1, according to the Keynesian eff ect described above, and also considering that a sense of fairness may encourage low-paid workers to react to the wage diff erentials not justifi ed by labour productivity diff erentials. Th ey are unable to reach this goal by obtaining higher money wages via wage bargaining and, therefore, they contract debts with the banking system in order to obtain a level of income at least equal of that of workers in Sector 2. 19 Workers spend a ratio of their current wage to repay debt. Th e banking system is assumed to be accommodating, both with respect to the demand for fi nance on the part of fi rms and to consumer credit. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that consumers demand an equal amount of goods 1 and 2, and that the money interest rate is equal both on fi rms' and workers' demand for credit. Th e unitary money wage is a given, depending on the relative bargaining powers of workers and fi rms and the level of employment is settled based on the degree of capital utilization (cf. Lavoie 1992: ch. 5).
3) It is assumed that current investments have been fi nanced in the previous circuit.
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Th e employment functions in the two sectors are:
Where N 1 and N 2 are respectively the number of workers employed in Sector 1 and Sector 2, while K is the amount of capital and 0 ≤ d 1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ d 2 ≤ 1 are respectively the rate of utilization of capital in Sector 1 and in Sector 2. For the sake of simplicity a constant rate of capital utilization is assumed here. 21 Th e two sectors are not integrated and the distribution of employment among the two sectors is a given, depending on the specialization of the economy. Given w 1 and w 2 , the wage bill paid in both the sectors becomes: man and physical) capital they can use, low-paid workers, usually employed in small fi rms with high job insecurity, are forced to provide fi rms with high labour intensity in order to increase the probability of the renewal of their contracts. See Ramaswamy/Rowthorn (1991) . 19 Th e rationale for this assumption can be found in diff erent factors, above all the consideration that usually low-paid workers enter temporary labour contracts with high job insecurity. Th erefore, they are likely to be more interested in the renewal of their contracts than in high wages. Otherwise, labour ›fl exibility‹ acts as a discipline device, thus reducing union bargaining power. Moreover, even if an equal bargaining power of high-paid and low-paid workers is assumed, the relative incomes do not vary and, as a result, emulation still occurs, and it still occurs to the same degree. It could be added that -in a dynamic framework -insofar as low-paid workers systematically enjoy a lower bargaining power, the aspiration gap tends to become higher and higher and, as a result, low-paid workers' indebtedness would tend to grow over time. 20 Th is assumption will be discussed below. 21 Th is assumption will be discussed below.
Th e Keynesian emulative eff ect is captured by the following equation:
Equation 5 shows the desired wage by the high-paid workers which is assumed to be exactly equal to the wage earned in Sector 1. On the other hand low-paid workers desire a level of wage higher than what they can obtain in Sector 2. Specifi cally, low-paid workers aim at gaining αw 1 > w 2 of the wage earned in Sector 1d in Sector 1. α is here named as degree of emulation exogenously given. While the wage bill desired in Sector 1 is exactly equal to its eff ective level the wage bill desired in Sector 2 is given by the following function ; ;
On the basis of equations (7) and (4) we can fi nd the amount of fi nancial need of type-2 workers which shows the amount of credit demanded by the same group and supplied by banks.
( ) 2  2  2  2  2  2  2 2  2  2  2 2  1  2   ; ; ;
Given (8) the debt of type-2 workers will be given by the fi nancial need plus interest:
where i is the average rate of interest on the total amount of workers' fi nancing. 22 Let us assume a reimbursement plan of the debt with constant repayments. Given n periods the debt reimbursed in each period will be:
We can now fi nd the ratio of the wage bill that type-2 workers will set aside so as to repay their debt. 23 We have:
( 1 2 ) Aggregate net money profi ts are: 
( 1 3 ) Where F 1 is the total amount of fi nancing supplied to fi rms.
Equations 13 and 14 establish that aggregate money net profi ts increase 1) in consumer credit and, hence, in the degree of emulation among workers, 2) in the number of periods (n) where workers must reimburse their debt, and decrease in the money interest rate. 24 Note also that the higher the employment level in Sector 2, the higher the aggregate money profits. Th is is because only workers employed in Sector 2 enter consumer credit and, hence, only these workers provide fi rms with an excess of liquidity compared to their wage. Th e rationale for conclusion 1) is that banks' fi nancing of consumption constitutes an additional input of purchasing power into the monetary circuit, while the rationale for conclusion 2) is that as n increases, the available gross income also increases in the current period, thus giving rise to an increase in current expenditures. Accordingly, the ›paradox of profi ts‹ can be solved by considering that banks also fi nance workers by means of consumer credit.
Th e formal conditions for π > 0 are the following:
23 Workers' propensity to set aside part of their income to repay debt is likely to depend on institutional factors (such as the prevailing customs underlying bank-consumer contracts) as well as on workers' expectations on their future wages. Specifi cally, if workers expect an increase of future wages they will tend to consume more in the present period. Moreover, it is likely to depend also on the interest rate. In particular, a high interest rate may discourage the demand for consumer credit and, as a result, reduce demand and hence profi ts. Th e inverse relation between the rate of money interest and money profi ts is thus confi rmed not only because high interest rates are directly a cost for fi rms, but also because high interest rates are indirectly associated with low profi ts via low workers' indebtedness and low aggregate demand. For the sake of simplicity, these eff ects are not explored here. 24 Th is latter conclusion holds under the condition that the demand for money on the part of fi rms is rigid enough, so that the increase in the money interest rate determines a consequent increase in
Equation 15a establishes that -for any values of n -the interest bill on the part of fi rms must be lower than workers' indebtedness. Equation 15b establishes that as n increases, since this implies a higher gross disposable income in the present period, the money interest rate must fall in order to guarantee aggregate money profi ts higher than zero. By contrast, equation 15c states that as the interest rate on consumer credit increases, the number of periods in which workers repay their debt must increase in order to guarantee positive monetary aggregate profi ts. Let us now analyse the relation between consumer credit and the price level. Since, by assumption, fi rms fi x prices based on the mark-up rule, and including interest, prices in the two sectors are:
where w 1 > w 2 and, hence, since labour productivity, the rate of profi ts and the interest rate are equal in both sectors, p 1 > p 2 . Moreover, insofar as workers distribute their consumption in equal parts between both sectors, profi ts in Sector 1 equal ½ of total profi ts. Hence:
Note that d can be conceived as both a constant rate of capital utilization -depending on purely technical variables, as assumed here for simplicity's sake -and a ›behavioural‹ coefficient, relating above all to fi rms' expectations on aggregate demand. Within the Post Keynesian theoretical framework, three main views on this issue can be traced. In his seminal contribution, Sylos Labini (1971) argues that fi rms use their capital stock as a device in order to prevent the entry of competitors in oligopolistic markets. Steindl (1952) stresses that -as a rule -fi rms do not exploit the whole capital they have, due to the fact that maintaining capital underutilization can solve the problem of rapidly increasing production when demand increases, in contexts of high and fundamental uncertainty. Lavoie (1992: 125) maintains that a fi rm's tendency to underutilize capital depends on purely technical factors, namely the indivisibility of plants.
For the sake of the argument presented here, by relaxing the initial assumption, one can regard d as a variable, depending on expected demand. In this context, the key question regards the relation between d 1 and d 2 , since -as resulting from equations (18) and (19) -type-1 profi ts increase as d 2 increases, for every variation of d 1 . At the same time, if d 2 increases so does the price of type-1 fi rms (p 1 ), since p 1 includes the rate of profi ts, which, in turn, is positively aff ected by the increase in capital utilization on the part of type-2 fi rms. Th is conclusion states that the improvement of expectations on the part of type-2 fi rms, by increasing the rate of profi ts of type-1 fi rms, generates a reduction of real wages. Th is occurs because -in this model -monetary profi ts can result only insofar as an infl ux of purchasing power external to fi rms as a whole is in operation.
By inserting 18 and 19 into the price equations, one obtains:
And the average prices are:
Equation 22 establishes that worker debt increases the price level, so that consumer credit causes infl ationary pressures, and the greater the propensity to emulate, the wider the aspiration gap, and the higher the infl ation.
On the basis of equation 22, the unitary real wages in the two sectors are:
Equations 23 and 24 establish that the higher the worker indebtedness, the lower the unitary real wage. Th is occurs because the increase in consumer credit determines an increase in profi ts and, hence, for a given value of capital, an increase in the average rate of profi ts. As a result, prices increase and, since the unitary money wage is a given, the average real wage declines. Hence, the more workers tend to become indebted -which, in turn, depends on their tendency to emulate -the more real wages tend to decline. Note that emulation on the part of type-1 workers generates negative externalities at the expense of type-2 workers, insofar as indebtedness produces a decline in real wages for workers as a whole. Consumer credit is, at the same time, the cause and eff ect of a ›bad‹ income distribution. Moreover, real wages also decline as the interest rate grows. Th is is because the increase in the interest rate produces an increase in prices and, hence, a reduction of w/p.
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When a sector producing investment goods is explicitly considered, the following causal links hold. Since capital goods are produced to be sold to the sector producing wage goods, the expansion of this sector can occur only in the case fi rms producing consumption goods plan an expansion of the future output. If this is the case, in the current circuit, banks' financing of the production of capital goods implies that more workers are employed. For a given unitary money wage, total demand increases, and so do short-run profi ts of fi rms producing consumption goods. In the event workers employed in the sector producing capital goods are low paid workers, total demand increases not only for the increase in N, but also for the increase of indebtedness. In any case, fi rms producing consumption goods react by increasing prices, so that the increase of investments produce further infl ationary pressures. Th is result is consistent with the conclusions reached in most MTP models, where -as emphasised, in particular, by Graziani (2003: 71) -in a context where fi rms can autonomously decide to produce consumption goods or investment goods, this latter choice -by generating a decline of the supply of consumption goods -produces forced saving. 28 However, 26 Note that a) the increase in prices reduces the real interest bill at the expense of the banking system. A possible reaction is the increase in the monetary interest rate, thus giving rise -in a dynamic context -to further infl ationary pressure deriving from feedback eff ects involving interest-price dynamics; b) the decline of the average real wage is not stopped by an endogenous mechanism, even if the unitary real wage falls below a given level of subsistence wage. If this is the case, social confl ict is likely to occur. 27 Contrary to Bertola/Koeniger (2007) the unequal income distribution here is generated within an accommodating banking system (in a similar vein see Brady 2007) . Th e authors instead point out that a non accommodating banking system produces an unequal income distribution because of the reduction in debtors' available income. 28 In Graziani's model, capital goods are acquired by fi rms producing consumption goods by using their profi ts. Th is implies that »investment fi nds its fi nal fi nance in savings« (Graziani 2003: 71) .
in a long-run perspective, the increase of production of capital goods can produce increases in output and defl ationary pressures, if the improvement of the quality of capital goods positively aff ects labour productivity. Note also that interest payments are not only costs of production for fi rms, but also income accruing to wealthy households who own fi nancial assets, so that these payments can be used to add to aggregate demand. Th e additional fl ow of money spent by rentiers or bankers does not invalidate our previous conclusions. At the end of the circuit, in fact bankers are in a position to spend their profi ts, partly deriving from the reimbursement of the fi nancing by fi rms and partly deriving from the reimbursement of workers' indebtedness. Hein (2008: 3 and ch. 17) observes that the interest income (partly or wholly) may be spent in order to acquire consumption goods in a theoretical context where money supply is endogenous and the key variable for determining the amount of fi nancial rents is the money interest rate set by the central bank. Th e expenditure on the part of bankers increases aggregate demand, thus amplifying the vicious circle described above, if capacity utilisation is taken to be given and constant: Th e increase of demand causes an increase in the rate of profi ts and, thus, of the price level, so that high fi nancial rents are associated with low levels of real wages (Docherty 2005: 215) . Note also that since, in this theoretical framework, employment is settled by fi rms under a given technological setting, the increase in demand does not aff ect it. Moreover, since fi nancial rents are normally used to acquire luxury goods, and luxury goods are normally produced with low capital/labour ratio, high financial rents -in a long-run perspective -can signifi cantly modify the specialization of the economy: In particular, it can push fi rms to use labour-intensive techniques (see Forges Davanzati 2007) . 29 Th e model suggests in conclusion that the distributive confl ict is in operation on three diff erent grounds. First, high bank profi ts, driven by high interest rates, reduce profi ts, via the increase in the fi nancial costs for fi rms, thus giving rise to an inverse relation between the interest rate and the rate of profi t (i.e. ›fi nancial‹ vs. ›industrial circulation‹). Second, industrial profi ts depend on low wages and, in the scheme proposed here, by workers' indebtedness, which in turn depends on the degree of emulation and on the degree of segmentation of the labour market. Th e rate of profi t is hence inversely related to the average real wage because we have assumed a constant rate of capacity utilisation. Th ird, high interest rates, insofar as they determine high price levels, reduce the average real wage, so that the interest rate is inversely related to the rate of wages.
Concluding remarks
Th is paper dealt with two main questions. Firstly, the so-called paradox of profi ts which arises within the MTP is addressed, by stressing that worker indebtedness can guarantee the making of money profi ts for fi rms as a whole. Worker indebtedness, in turn, has been conceived here as being dependent on emulation, and, particularly, on the relative wage eff ect described by Keynes in the General Th eory. Secondly, it has been shown that consumer credit is caused by and determines unequal income distribution. Th e rationale for this conclusion is that as debt increases, so does the rate of profi ts, and so does the price level. As a result, for a given unitary money wage, the higher the workers' debt, the lower the real wages.
